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BOOK REVIEW

Revitalizing American Liberalism
LAW. BRUCE ACKERMAN. Cambridge,
Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 1984. Pp. viii, 118. $16.00.
RECONSTRUCTING AMERICAN

DAVID GREGORY*

T

HE past several years have been especially difficult for liberalism. 1 With the exception of the fitful and disjointed Carter
Administration, the White House has been occupied by Republi-

cans distinctly to the right of the political center. Since 1968, liberalism has been quite unwelcome in the corridors of the execu-

tive branch of the federal government. During this same period,
the Supreme Court, under Warren Burger, has forged a jurisprudence inimical to liberalism. Congress, while under Democratic
control for most of the past two decades, has been either too captivated by special interests or unduly influenced by the anti-liberal
biases of the other branches of the government to pursue a coordinated liberal political agenda. 2 Since the final days of the domes* Associate Professor of Law, St. John's University. J.D., University of Detroit, 1980;
LL.M, Yale University, 1982.
1. Some scholars have posited sweeping, near-metaphysical definitions of "liberalism."
See, eg., R. UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND PoLrrmcs (1975). Classical liberalism certainly has many
interrelated social, economic, political, and philosophical components. See, e.g., J. MILL, ON
Lm.RTY (London 1859). For present purposes, liberalism will be understood to have a
more applied and contemporary political meaning, stemming primarily from the New Deal
programs of President Franklin Roosevelt. The Great Society programs of President Johnson continued that liberal tradition. For the past half-century, liberalism has reflected a
positive tension between freedom of the private person and responsibilities of the public
citizen, and, on a broader scale, between individual rights and the legitimate needs of limited government. Liberalism is an optimistic and progressive politics. It emphasizes individual freedom, fundamental human rights, and dignity, balanced with the collective good and
social and governmental responsibility for the disadvantaged. These are some of the continuing themes of Madisonian democracy, as expressed, for instance, in the FederalistPapers. Professor Ackerman has recently examined these constitutional law themes and core
liberal tenets in Ackerman, Discovering the Constitution, 93 YALE L.J. 1013 (1984).
2. For example, the Democratic Congress during the Carter Administration was unable to pass labor law reform legislation that would have provided more effective remedies
for employer unfair-labor-practice violations of the National Labor Relations Act (codified
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tic legislative program of the Johnson "Great Society" and the
passing of the Warren Court there has not been anything remotely resembling a principled spirit of liberal politics operating
under the aegis of the federal government.3 Indeed, the Reagan
Administration overtly pursues a pernicious amalgamation of
"trickle down" economics and militaristic adventurism at the expense of social welfare programs and, at best, with indifference to
the protection of individual rights afforded by the Warren Court
and Great Society legislation to persons situated at the lower end
of the socio-economic spectrum.4 Perhaps most ironically, President Reagan is especially fond of quoting Franklin Roosevelt. On
the level of national politics, liberalism has largely been consigned
to the scrap heap-it is a ghost only occasionally and fleetingly
as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1982)). Legislation which would have become the
Labor Reform Act of 1977, H.R. 8410, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1976), passed the House of
Representatives by a vote of 257 to 163. However, it failed to pass the Senate after six
rejected cloture attempts. See 36 CONG. Q.W. REP. 1599 (1978). More recently, during the
Reagan Administration, Congress has been hard-pressed to extend the Voting Rights Act
of 1965 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973-1 9 7 3 (p) (1982)). Perhaps most
significantly, a majority of the Democrats in Congress uncritically supported the tax-reduction legislation successfully sponsored by the Reagan Administration, at the expense of a
wide range of liberal social-welfare programs.
3. The Warren Court is not offered as the idealized paragon of liberal jurisprudence.
However, it is beyond dispute that the Warren Court enunciated a broad jurisprudence
generally consonant with major principles of liberalism. This is perhaps best exemplified in
the heightened due process protection afforded to the individual rights of criminal defendants and the historically disadvantaged.
While it is dubious whether any principled liberal could endorse a national political
agenda premised on the economic "growth" fueled by the Vietnam War, domestic legislation during the Johnson Administration afforded sweeping and meaningful protections for
the individual rights of the historically disadvantaged. Two major examples are the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1447, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1975a1975d, 2000a-2000h-6 (1982)) and the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (codified as amended at
42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973-1973(p) (1982)).
Thus, while no period in American history can stand as a pristine hallmark of ideal
liberalism, the period from 1964 to 1968 stands in marked contrast to the coldly pragmatic
right-of-center era of the subsequent Republican administrations.
4. It would be entirely inappropriate to attach the label "conservative" to this hybrid
of current political contortions. Principled, enlightened Burkean conservatives would undoubtedly and justifiably resent being included under the same semantic umbrella. See, e.g.,
G. WILL, STATECRAFr AS SOULCRAFT (1983). Semantic labels necessarily are imprecise generalizations. However, rather than indulge in a long and ultimately frustrating exegesis for a
definition of conservatism, the term "right-of-center" shall here be used to refer to the
Nixon, Ford, and Reagan administrations, with due apologies to the intellectual and philosophical champions of principled conservatism. See, e.g., R. NozICx, ANARACHY, STATE AND
UTOPIA

(1974).
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glimpsed in the federal corridors of political power. Rather than
inspire a resurgence of liberalism, Democratic political pragmatism has resulted in the appearance of the "neoliberal." 5 However, it is premature to determine whether these newly christened
neoliberal politicians will prove capable heirs of the New Deal legacy, or whether they will ultimately eschew liberalism for a
strange non-liberal assortment of special interests based primarily
on short-term political expediency.
Often liberalism has seemed to be little more than a whipping
boy for its opponents at the extremes of the legal and political
spectrums. From the right, the Posnerian "wealth maximizers"
of Chicago school of law and economics have conducted an influential campaign. These thinkers have forged not only their own
market vision of law and economics, but also at least implicitly, a
more fundamental political vision. The power of the Chicago vision has even, mirabile dictu, pervaded that last proud bastion of
legal liberalism, Yale Law School.7 By current popular account,
5. The "neoliberal" political program is a curious hybrid of Democratic social principles and Reaganomics, combining "traditional Democratic compassion for the downtrodden and outcast elements of society with different vehicles than categorical aid programs or
quota systems or new federal bureacracies." R. ROTHENBERG, THE NEOLIBERALS 16 (1984).
Once again, it is virtually impossible to formulate a single definition of "neoliberal." Id. at
21-22. The neoliberals do not have any special allegiance to the labor, blue collar, ethnic,
and minority groups that have been the traditional constituencies of the Democratic Party.
Rather, the neoliberal politicians, primarily "new Democrats," see computerized service
enterprises as the best avenue for revitalizing the economy and creating new jobs into the
next century. It is curious and perhaps more than coincidental that Senator Gary Hart,
former Senator Paul Tsongas, and former Governor Jerry Brown, three of the principal
neoliberal political thinkers, were all loose contemporaries of Professor Ackerman as students at Yale Law School during the sixties. Professor Robert Reich of Harvard's Kennedy
School of Government, who graduated from Yale Law School in the early seventies, is a
close and influential advisor to many of the neoliberal politicians. His book, The Next American Frontier, has become the primary manifesto in the neoliberal platform for industrial
revitalization. See R. REICH, THE NEXT AMERICAN FRONTIER 201-82 (1983).

6. It would be both unnecessary and cumbersome to catalogue all of Judge Richard
Posner's influential and voluminous work. For a sample of his most important books, exemplifying the purported virtues of wealth maximization and market efficiency, see R. POSNER,
(2d ed. 1977); R. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE (1981). In
addition, Posner has written scores of influential articles expounding the Chicago version
of law and economics. Before being appointed to the Seventh Circuit bench by President
Reagan, Judge Posner had been a professor of law at University of Chicago Law School for
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW

several years.
7. For an interesting, popular account of Yale Law School as the training ground, legal
laboratory, incubator, and think tank of legal and political liberalism in the 1960's, see D.
BRODER, THE CHANGING OF THE GUARD:

POWER

AND LEADERSHIP IN AMERICA

226-29 (1980).
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Yale is fast becoming the Chicago of the East." While this is probably still somewhat of an exaggeration,9 it is undeniable that the
right-of-center political and social vision of Chicago law and economics has had pervasive influence on contemporary legal scholarship. More importantly, the Reagan Administration has been
particularly enamoured with and influenced by Chicago thinking,
as manifested in both important executive 0 and judicial"
appointments.
Just as Chicago/Yale law and economics dominates academic
legal proceedings and scholarship on the right, the current darling in legal scholarship from the radical left of center is undoubtedly the "critical legal studies" movement."2 Both the popular"
See also supra note 5.
8. Trillin, A Reporter at Large: Harvard Law, The New Yorker, Mar. 26, 1984, at 53,
76.
9. Currently Yale Law School is perhaps more deserving than ever of the characterization that it comprises a faculty of "young fogies and old turks." While some of its younger
faculty members, especially George Priest and Anthony Kronman, are making their own
important contributions to the law-and-economics literature, senior faculty members, such
as Charles Black and Thomas Emerson, remain stalwart and preeminent defenders of the
liberal faith.
10. William Baxter, as Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Antitrust Division
of the Department of Justice, thoroughly restructured the policy and the operation underlying enforcement (or, perhaps more precisely, the lack thereo o of antitrust law before his
recent return to the faculty of Stanford Law School.
11. Three of the movement's most influential legal academics have been appointed to
federal courts of appeals. In addition to Richard Posner's appointment to the Seventh Circuit from University of Chicago Law School, Robert Bork, a staunch advocate for the elimination of antitrust law, see R. BORK, THE ANITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH
ITsELF (1978), left Yale Law School for the District of Columbia Circuit. Ralph Winter, also
from Yale Law School and a right-of-center advocate of law and economics, is now on the
Second Circuit bench. One must speculate that they are now "sanitized" with judicial appellate experience as propaedeutic to elevation to the Supreme Court during a second Reagan term.
12. "Critical legal studies" [hereinafter CLS] cannot be defined in any mechanical
fashion. Contemporary CLS scholars of the 1970's and early 1980's are as intellectually
varied as the members of the "legal realist" movement of a half-century earlier. For a
representative list of legal realists, see infra note 34. Generally, CLS theorists are younger
legal academics often at elite law schools, actively subscribing to markedly left-of-center
political agendas. Combining socialist and Marxist themes, the movement views law as a
political instrument for accomplishing political objectives. Very disenchanted with liberal
legalism, CLS is radical leftist politics in legal guise, spiced with heavy doses of continental

philosophy. The movement sees law, politics, and philosophy as inextricably interwoven
and historically contingent instruments of either status quo elitist repression of the masses,
or, ultimately, as instruments of human liberation. See Unger, The Critical Legal Studies
Movement, 96 HARv. L.. REv. 563 (1983).
13. See Trillin, supra note 8, at 76.
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and legal academic' 4 literature is replete with great debates waged
by and among critical-legal-studies scholars.
Critical legal studies has pursued an analogous strategy to
that of the Chicago law and economics scholars. Both groups
made their mark initially, at least in part, by direct attacks on liberalism. From the right, liberalism was perceived as the counterproductive wrench in the works of perfect free market efficiency.
Purporting to have successfully dislodged and discarded the liberal wrench, the Chicago law and economics school has been
more recently preoccupied with constructing its own vision of the
perfect market society. Liberalism, while perceived as occasionally
troublesome, is no longer deemed worthy of serious critical attention. At most, castigating liberalism is only a momentary distraction from the Chicagoan's core task of greasing the wheels of the
free market. At first, scholars in the radical left of the criticallegal-studies camp also directly attacked liberalism. 1 5 However,
now satisfied, or at least satiated, by its largely one-dimensional,
nihilistic indulgence in the paroxysms of "trashing"' 6 and "deconstructing,"' 7 critical legal studies is poised to embark upon the
more challenging program of constructing its own alternative,
presumably quasi-Marxist, vision to the "myths" and "artificial hi14. The most recent and comprehensive example of the attention devoted to the CLS
movement is Critical Legal Studies Symposium, 36 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1984). See also THE POLrrICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRrriQUE (D. Kairys, ed. 1982) (compendium of representative
CLS scholarship).
One broad and sweeping, but obtuse exposition of the movement's tenets can be found
in Unger, supra note 12. Indeed, despite some theoretical inconsistencies in his later work,
Professor Roberto Unger of Harvard Law School is probably the most erudite left-ofcenter critic of liberalism writing today. His classic book, Knowledge and Politics is very important both for its telling indictment of liberalism and for providing much of the broad
philosophical foundations for later CLS scholarship. See R. UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND POLrrICs 1-144 (1975). See also R. UNGER, PASSION: AN ESSAY ON PERSONALITY 3-89 (1984) (inquiry
into the psychodynamics of relationships); this work is much less CLS-directed than Unger's earlier, more political work.
Perhaps the most important individual CLS articles are those of Professor Duncan Kennedy. See, e.g., Kennedy, The Structure of Blackstone's Commentaries, 28 BUFFALO L. REV. 209
(1979); Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685
(1976).
15. See R. UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND POLrICs, supra note 14, at 1-144.
16. See Freeman, Truth and Mystification in Legal Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 1229 (1981);
Kelman, Trashing, 36

17.
STAN.

STAN.

L. REV. 293 (1984).

Tushnet, CriticalLegal Studies and ConstitutionalLaw: An Essay in Deconstruction, 36
L. REV. 623 (1984).
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erarchies" of liberal "domination."" s
Thus, liberalism has been a common initial referent for its
vitriolic critics on diametrically opposite ends of the politico-economic spectrum. The radical opposites each regarded liberalism
as a knowing,
and thus especially despicable, betrayal of the
"true" faith;1 9 the only remaining dispute, of course, is over the
"true" faith, and whether it is monopolized by critical legal studies or Chicago economics. Liberalism is thus perceived by each
radical camp more as an unwilling convert rather than as a bold
heretic. If the last gasp of contemporary liberalism were only to
serve as an unwitting springboard for the radically different critical legal studies and Chicago visions, it would be an ignominious
end to the rich tradition of Locke and Madison, of Brandeis and
Warren. To complete this bleak scenario, if it were not already
dismal enough, several of those clinging to the liberal faith have
searchingly questioned its contemporary purpose and utility in occasionally thoughtful terms, but more often in self-flagellating mea
maxima culpas.2 ° To be sure, liberals have not totally abandoned
the field. 1 However, defenders of the liberal faith have been alternately hard pressed and then ignored by both the left and the
right.
Professor Bruce Ackerman 22 incisively invites dialogue within
and about refined New Deal liberalism with his elegant and elo18. See generally Critical Legal Studies Symposium, 36 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1984).
19. Professor Mark Tushnet is one of the most prominent and prolific members of the
CLS movement. His ad personam review of the major constitutional law treatise-American
ConstitutionalLaw-is an exaggerated but pointed example of the attitude of many radical
leftists toward liberalism: "[H]ow could so morally obtuse a work be taken so seriously?
The answer can be found in Professor Tribe's ambition .

. .

. [T]he Framers would have

understood the phenomenon that Professor Tribe's work represents: they called it corruption." Tushnet, Dia-Tribe, 78 MICH. L. REV. 694, 710 (1980). Other recent legal and popular literature offers further evidence of the mixture of the hauteur, elitism, anarchism, and
more-than-occasional brilliance of CLS scholarship and its equally curious attitudes of contempt, fear, loathing, and sometimes nonchalant disregard of liberalism. See supra note 14.
20. See generally M. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE (1982); LIBERALISM
RECONSIDERED (D. McLean, C. Mills eds. 1983).
21. Two of the most influential liberal thinkers in philosophy and law are John Rawls,
a professor of philosophy at Harvard, and Ronald Dworkin, a professor ofjurisprudence at
Oxford University and New York University Law School. Their most important individual
books are, respectively, J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971), and R. DWORKIN, TAKING
RIGHTS SERIOUSLY

(1977).

22. Professor Ackerman has been the Beekman Professor of Law and Philosophy at
Columbia University Law School since 1982. He had been a professor of law at University
of Pennsylvania from 1972 to 1974, and at Yale from 1974 to 1982.
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quent new book, ReconstructingAmerican Law. The work is certain
to provoke responses from both the left and the right. It restores
the flagging liberal spirit from quiescence and dormancy, offering
an optimistic, progressive political vision. Professor Ackerman
guarantees that liberals are again competently represented in the
debate that previously had been monopolized by law-and-economics theorists and critical-legal-studies scholars-a debate that, one
hopes, will eventually be transformed into a productive dialogue.
Reconstructing American Law is also an important continuation and
significant refinement of the themes of Ackerman's earlier book,
SocialJustice in the Liberal State.2 3 SocialJustice was a rich and broad
allegory of intergalactic Socratic dialogue, a creative application
of Rawlsian theory to the American political landscape. Professor
Ackerman has abandoned the innovative, but now regrettably faddish 24 and not-so-nearly productive, Socratic method for a much
more focused and perhaps more thoughtful inquiry. Unfortunately, the virtues of stylistic precision in Reconstructing American
Law militate somewhat against the free-fall, occasionally loose, but
often innovative and ingenious inquiry in Social Justice. While his
new book thus does not leave nearly as many "loose ends," unfortunately neither can it pursue the many open possibilities that it so
richly suggests. These are certainly not fatal nor even substantive
flaws; they are the perhaps necessary consequences of a far more
succinct and pointed inquiry. Indeed, Reconstructing American Law
is intended merely as a reawakening and revitalization of liberal
discourse; it hardly postures for any illusory final word. With this
in mind, Professor Ackerman has provided an agenda for productive legal discussion well into the next century for lawyers of every
political/economic stripe. Whether or not it is destined to become
a legal classic (a heady but largely irrelevant speculation), it is certainly an important contribution to both the legal academic literature and to the liberal vision of how we might better live our professional lives as lawyers, our public lives as responsible citizens,
23. B. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE (1980). Ackerman insists that
lawyers and legal thinkers focus on "structural facts," thus "prepar[ing] the way for a new
kind of legal dialogue that seeks to explicate the complex character of the struggle for

social justice in a liberal activist state." B. ACKERMAN, RECONSTRUCTING
(1984) [hereinafter cited as RECONSTRUCTING AMERICAN LAw].
24.

AMERICAN LAW

See, e.g., Gabel & Kennedy, Roll Over Beethoven, 36 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1984).
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and our private lives as persons with fundamental dignity.2" Fittingly enough, in 1984, it also offers a glimpse of the ominous
Orwellian alternatives we might face if the offer of a renewed,
revitalized liberal dialogue is rejected for more immediate, but ultimately less-informed, alternatives.
Ackerman begins by focusing on the New Deal. Rather than
conduct a substantive analysis of the merits and efficacy of its particular programs, he looks at the past fifty years of the New Deal
legacy as a period transforming legal discourse. The activist liberal state has yielded new legal values, and, just as fundamentally,
has forced lawyers to think and to speak of legal controversies in
new ways. Rather than engage in the nihilistic leveling of critical
legal studies, 26 Ackerman articulates and examines the new language of power that lawyers in the activist liberal state are only
now beginning to use. This post-New Deal stating of the facts and
values of clients to persuade decisionmakers has led to a new legal
' '2
discourse of power and is termed "legal constructivism. 7
Unpacking the nature and content of the beginnings and suggesting possible future directions of legal constructivism is the
core task of the book. Ackerman, however, does not cavalierly dismiss the alternatives to the activist liberal state. Much of the book
is at least indirectly devoted to unmasking the inadequacies of
critical legal studies and Chicago law and economics. Though adherents of these alternative camps may not want to acknowledge
it, Ackerman concludes that even they owe their vitality to the
activist liberal state. This is not to say that the liberal state is guaranteed in perpetuity. It certainly is not. However, if the constructivist dialogue fails and the liberal state collapses, totalitarian technocratic tyranny will result. 8 In the wake of the failed liberal
25.

For Professor Ackerman's exploration of these broader Madisonian themes, see

Ackerman, Discovering the Constitution, 93 YALE L.J. 1013 (1984).
26. See, e.g., Kelman, supra note 16; Tushnet, supra note 17; supra note 19.
27.
[Wlhat we are witnessing is the birth of a distinctive form of legal discourse-professionally stabilized rhetoric that increasing numbers of lawyers
will be obliged to master if they hope to translate their clients' grievances into a
language that powerholders will find persuasive; a new language of power, premised on a distinctive set of attitudes toward fact and value, that I shall call
Legal Constructivism.
RECONSTRUCING AMERICAN LAW, supra note 23, at 3.
28. "It is precisely this professional commitment to public dialogue that must remain
at the foundation of the activist state if it is not one day to collapse upon us all in some

REVITALIZING AMERICAN LIBERALISM
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state, neither critical legal studies nor Chicago economics will be
liberalism's successor, but instead will remain stranded in their respective "never-never" lands of quasi-Marxist or perfect-market
dreams. Ackerman's conclusion stems not from a narrow intellectual hubris but rather from a thorough assessment of legal and
technical culture. To avoid technocratic tyranny and to enable the
limited, partial fruition of the activist liberal state, lawyers must
amalgamate the virtues of critical legal studies and Chicago economics into the new legal discourse that, after fifty years, is the
legacy of the New Deal. 29 Allowing the evolution of the activist
liberal state to continue into the next century is the best vehicle
for maintaining the dynamic tension between individual freedom
and social justice, personal liberty and communal responsibility."
Of course, those who see liberalism as the arch-villain will undoubtedly wax apoplectic at this purported liberal co-option of
their own theories. Yet, as others have pointed out,31 while they
may rail against liberalism, the fact remains that they are free to
conduct their crusades only within the freedoms provided by the
liberal state. This core paradox confronting the anti-liberals is
quite plain to Ackerman. 2 While there are no guarantees that the
awful form of technocratic tyranny." Id. at 110.
29.
I have no doubt, moreover, that liberal activists have much to learn from a
serious dialogue with their critics. After all, if we are to redeem the promise of
the New Deal, American lawyers can blind themselves to neither the libertarian
nor the communitarian visions of the dissenters. The challenge instead is to
grasp both of our critics' half-truths at the same time and build the legal foundations of a world where the affirmation of individual freedom does not conceal
the pervasive reality of social injustice, where the affirmation of communal responsibility enriches the significance of personal liberty.
Id. at 104 (emphasis supplied).
30.

Id.

31.
Critical scholars who describe "capitalist" society as oppressive or hierarchical
are like New Yorkers who speak of Cleveland as being in the "West." Contemporary capitalist society may be oppressive and hierarchical judged by some
ideal standard and yet have less oppression and hierarchy than most or even all
other societies that have ever existed. Critical legal writing systematically evades
the question, "Compared to what?"
Johnson, Do You Sincerely Want to Be Radical?, 36 STAN. L. REV. 247, 260 (1984).

32.
Certain things are so plain as to be beyond serious argument. Thus, it is no
longer plausible to assert that American law is governed by strict adherence to
Lockean principles of laissez-faire government; it is equally silly to suppose that
the New Deal ushered in an era of Marxist collectivism. While right- and left-

548

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 33

liberal state will thrive into the next century, it remains our best
and most viable hope for a productive future. Drawing the positive contributions of critical legal studies and Chicago free market
scholars into the liberal discourse, activist liberal lawyers also remain charged with the core liberal task of "elaborat[ing] the aims
of a legal system that is activist
without being authoritarian, lib' 33
eral without being libertarian.

All American lawyers today are heirs of the New Deal. The
question now is what they will do with their legacy. With the rich
history of the past half-century as a professional anchor, engaging
in the new language of legal constructivism is, Ackerman proposes, the best way to preserve and expand the liberal heritage.
While a great debt is owed to legal realism, 4 the realists glimpsed
only fragments of the liberal whole. Thus, realism became an inherently modest, isolated means of dealing with individual legal
problems. Realism was ultimately incapable of dealing with the
broader questions faced in the activist liberal state., Professor
Ackerman posits that constructivism will fill in the void left by Realism. Constructivism is "the way in which the legitimation of an
activist state fundamentally reshapes the lawyer's conversational
agenda, forcing the profession to address new questions in a new
way within a changing institutional setting." 8 The ultimate failure of Realism was that it left lawyers incapable of dealing with
the profoundly different bureaucratic administrative legal environment of the New Deal.
wing excursions into doctrinal analysis may well contain valuable insights, they
will inevitably oversimplify our present legal situation, whose distinctive complexity is generated by the New Deal's effort to depart from Lockean laissezfaire without taking the path to Marxist collectivism. The challenge, in short, is
to make sense of the distinctive topography of a legal system that aims to occupy the high middle ground disdained by the followers of Locke and Marx
alike.
RECONSTRUCTING AMERICAN LAW, supra note 23, at 79-80 (emphasis supplied).
33. Id. at 80.
34. The American legal realist school, the heyday of which is a half-century passed,
saw law as an interdisciplinary and contextual political process. Realism was the successor
to the legal positivism of Oliver Wendell Holmes. See O.W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10
HARV. L. REV. 457 (1897). Now, in turn, legal realism has proven the intellectual godfather
of many CLS theories. For representative legal realist work, see B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE
(1921); J. FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND (1930); Llewellyn,
A Realistic Jurisprudence-TheNext Step, 30 COLUM. L. REV. 431 (1930).
35. RECONSTRUCTING AMERICAN LAW, supra note 23, at 6-45.
36. Id. at 5.
OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS
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When lawyers were in most desperate need of coming to
terms with the new bureaucratic administrative state, realism's
skepticism about theoretical abstraction dodged the political crisis
of the New Deal.17 However spasmodic, realism's narrow intuitionistic adaption prevented a total collapse of legal discourse dur38
ing the New Deal.
Realism enabled lawyers to keep talking during a period of
profound professional adjustment. Now, fifty years later, the New
Deal is maturing into the activist liberal state. The administrative
bureaucracy now is quickly evolving into computer-based, hightechnology information processing and decisionmaking modalities.
Yet, if lawyers remain trapped in the inadequacies of narrow realism, they will be wholly incapable of exercising future professional
responsibilities. By professional default, lawyers will yield control
of constitutional government to the computerized technocrats,
with the attendant dangers of a broad collapse of liberal values.39
Therefore, to prevent the bankruptcy of liberal legal and political
culture, it is imperative that its guardians, the lawyers, begin the
dialogue of legal constructivism; "the thoughtful lawyer must recognize the development of a new language of power as a central
professional enterprise. ' '4 0 Ackerman maintains that law and law-

yers have the central roles to play in the activist liberal state.41
37. Id. at 17-19.
38. Id. at 19.
39. The computer technocrats, on the whole, do not have the intellectual appreciation
of our fundamental legal and political traditions. Without lawyers' political and historical
depth, computer-based systems analysts will make efficient, quantifiable choices that are,
nevertheless, morally bankrupt. Constitutional liberalism is largely founded on values of
intergenerational responsibility and on the quality and intensity of political ideas. These
less tangible constitutional political variables are not readily amenable to computer-based
decisionmaking, and they elude the calculus of the technocrats. However, they are at the
very heart of the constitutional fabric. If these values are neglected in the political decisionmaking process, we will be responding only fitfully to the popular and transient passions of the moment. We will lose our constitutional compass and any claim to legal and
social coherence.
For however skilled the computer analysts of the future become in finding relevant facts, I see very few signs of a reawakening of the technocratic mind from
its positivist slumbers. Instead, my conversations with M.B.A.'s and M.P.A.'s
and Ph.D.'s in universities, industry, and government have often revealed a
commitment to a kind of value-discourse so primitive and vulgar that it would
make even Chicago school lawyers blush.
Id. at 109-10.
40. Id. at 24.
41. Id. at 28.
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Developing the language of constructivism is indispensable if lawyers are to maintain their professional credibility and, far more
important, if the United States is to mature as an activist liberal
state rather than mutate into technocratic totalitarianism. 2
Constructivism will have a profound impact on all forms of
public and private adjudication. Ackerman calls this the problem
of coordinating reactive private law with activist public law; it is a
question of central significance for lawyers.43 Of course, the
Madisonian virtues of limited self interests and attendant legitimation of the private sphere complicates this element of the inquiry
for the activist liberal lawyer. However, it seems that constructivism, while acknowledging the legitimacy of the private sphere, will
be unable to preserve the ideal liberal equilibrium between the
public and private realms. Constructivism potentially threatens to
disrupt the public/private equilibrium. The collective state interest dominates individual liberty; the individual is consigned to a
secondary status. Absent some balancing mechanism, constructivism may be the contemporary leviathan. Ackerman fails to address
the serious difficulty, and, unfortunately, neglects to make more
than a passing reference to a fundamental problem: whether the
public/private distinction has continuing legitimacy."
Just as Ackerman's new constructivist liberalism 45 is moving
toward a version of the public sense of the law advocated by critical legal studies, his theory even more openly endorses the necessity of incorporating economics into legal language. However, he
takes pains to distinguish liberal economics from the various Chi42.
Insofar as they live in a liberal activist state, activist lawyers will be constantly
emphasizing the risk that heavy-handed intervention can become counter-

productive or illegitimate or both. . . . [F]ocused intervention will enhance,
rather than diminish, the exercise of individual rights and the quality of collective life. Activist legal discourse, in short, is entirely consistent with a strong
commitment to limited government.
Id. at 32 (emphasis supplied).
43.

Id. at 37.

44. To find the finest and most recent legal inquiry and critique of liberalism's public/
private distinction, presented primarily by prominent CLS scholars, see A Symposium, The
Public/PrivateDistinction, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1289-609 (1982).

45. Ackerman anticipated and attempted to counter the criticism that his endorsement of systemic analysis is not sufficiently tempered with an acknowlegement of the extent
to which law and society are influenced by individual and idiosyncratic forces. See RECONSTRUCrING AMERICAN LAW, supra note 23, at 93 n.20. See also Ackerman, Discovering the
Constitution, 93 YALE L.J. 1013 (1984).
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cago versions of perfect free-market efficiency. Distancing constructivism from both Chicago economics and critical legal studies, while utilizing the positive contributions of each group,
Ackerman urges that a mature law and economics dialogue "permits a vast enrichment of the conversational resources available to
lawyers trying to make sense of the legal foundations of an activist
state."'46 This delicate balancing and continuing effort to position
legal liberalism on the higher middle ground than the extremes
afforded by critical legal studies and Chicago economics is an admitted tension throughout the book. While it is more difficult for
liberalism to maintain any purist claims to theoretical uniqueness,
that is not a central concern. The core task instead is to insure
that the constructive legal dialogue moves forward. This separates
the philosopher from the lawyer. While the book surely has heavy
and healthy doses of philosophical analysis, it is essentially written
for the lawyer. If liberal lawyers must surrender some Rawlsian
purity47 and adopt the strengths of liberalism's critics to further
legal constructivism, so be it.48 Constructivist-activist liberalism is

thus an interesting hybrid of public law and economics and computer-based technological systems merged with New Deal values.
With this strong, synergistic foundation, legal constructivism is
well positioned to engage in the new legal "power-talk." Ackerman maintains that "reconstructing the facts" is essential to this
new legal language that activist liberal lawyers will use to argue
their clients' cases before future decisionmakers. He draws upon
Coase's classic theory49 to elucidate how activist liberal lawyers'
RECONSTRUCTING AMERICAN LAW, supra note 23, at 44.
47. Despite its many contributions to legal discourse, Rawlsian philosophy, if not balanced with legal pragmatics, can lead to "escaping to a never-never land that lies behind a
veil of ignorance." Id. at 96. Referring to the CLS/Chicago economics diatribes, Ackerman concludes that
no critic can reach ground that is higher than the position he chooses to assault.
. . .While I suppose all of us will have to endure an extended shouting match
pairing outrageous and self-congratulatory Chicagoan against obscure and critical Ungero-Marxist, I hope to urge the main line of conversation in a more
Constructive direction .... "[L]aw and economics" is forcing lawyers to argue
about facts and visions in precisely the ways described . . . by the shift from a
reactive to an activist state. Although, as in all pioneering efforts, the emerging
discourse is sometimes shockingly primitive, the task is to make Constructive
law-talk more sophisticated, rather than indulge in pseudo-critical posturing.
Id. at 43-45.
48. Id. at 96.
49. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & EcoN. 1 (1960).

46.
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new "power-talk" will occur. Coase destabilized myopic reactive
law and forced the lawyer-economist to look at the big picture,
the "multiplicity of factors." 50 This broad view was perhaps
augured by the Brandeisian "lawyer to the situation"; it does not
provide exclusive service to a particular individual client in an adversarial context. This Brandeisian view was perceived as the
height of dangerous unorthodoxy a century ago. 51 Perhaps it will
be vindicated in the constructivist liberal state of the future.
Ackerman does not develop the possibilities of non-adversarial lawyering in the activist liberal state. He continues to rely
on the conventional supposition of adversarial advocacy on behalf
of particular clients in future liberal legal practice.52 Yet, it seems
that a plausible result of constructivism may well be realization of,
at least in part, Brandeisian non-adversarial lawyering to the entire situation.53 Again, Ackerman's presumption of adversarial
lawyering is a continuing manifestation of the liberal faith in the
virtues of Madisonian self-interest. This, however, may well be an
increasingly arcane notion with less future viability in the constructivist dialogue. Even Ackerman seems to allude to the possibilities of constructivist liberal lawyers transcending adversarial
conventions toward a broader sense of their professional function."4 This may be heretical to the Madisonian purist, but it merits future discussion.
In addition to the refined law and economics built upon
Coase's theory, activist liberal lawyers must become masters of the
RECONSTRUCTING AMERICAN LAW, supra at 23, at 52.
51. Brandeis's unconventional, broad view of the lawyer's role as "counsel to the situation" jeopardized his ultimately successful Supreme Court nomination. See L. PAPER, BRANDEIS 226 (1983).
52. "I aim to mediate ongoing political conflict through a legal culture in which public
values are developed in the manner of American law, with adversaries arguing out the
merits of their claims under certain fundamental conversational constraints deeply entrenched within our legal tradition." RECONSTRUCrING AMERICAN LAW, supra note 23, at
100.
53. Whether non-adversarial lawyering will ever amount to more than adjudication by
robe-less magistrates remains, of course, an open question. See generally Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073 (1984).
54. Constructive analysis forces the legal conversation to begin at a new
point-starting the story with the possibility that the law might reconstruct organizational
forms in ways that allow citizens to ameliorate, if not eliminate, the conflicts that appear so
intractable on the surface of everyday life. RECONSTRUCTING AMERICAN LAW, supra note 23,
at 62-63.

50.
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computer technology, 55 without becoming servile addicts to quantification. 56 Presuming that the activist liberal lawyer, armed with
this formidable body of futuristic indispensable professional skills,
continues productive dialogue with fellow liberals and with serious
critics, lawyers will be able both to reconstruct statements of fact
and to ensure the fundamental liberal value of social justice in the
liberal state. The obvious myopia of Chicago economics 57 patently

demonstrates that simplistic exaltation of market efficiencies is not
the key to explicating constructivist legal values."8 However,
neither must lawyers return to the even-less-enlightened fragmentation of individual case-oriented Realism.59 Ackerman asserts that
the hope of our legal liberal future is a legal constructivism, an
innovative amalgamation of diverse theories, 60 yet still based on
classic liberal tenets and the special American liberalism of Madisonian theory and the New Deal.
The futuristic utilization of economics, computer science, and
related high-tech language must be welcomed by activist liberal
lawyers. Ackerman's liberal tenets of neutrality61 offer sufficient
insurance that liberalism will not be transformed into totalitarianism. Unfortunately, this is not sufficiently explicated. It is by no
means certain that Ackerman's two neutral principles guarding
against claims of intrinsic moral superiority are adequate insurance against totalitarianism. The assertion that they will is tenuous, especially as perceived by the critics of liberalism. It should
have been further elucidated rather than summarily disposed of
by a quick reference to his earlier work. Ackerman relies on a
55. Id. at 68.
56. Id. at 69. "Is it not obvious that if we allow claims of expertise to rest on a heap of
computer output, we do not merely risk incompetence and corruption, but bureaucratic
tyranny?" Id. at 76.
57. Preoccupied with their transactional analyses, Chicago economists often entirely
overlook the central CLS issue: the legitimacy of the system itself. But see Demsetz, Toward
a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REv. PAPERS & PROC. 347 (1967) (attempt to justify
property rights through law-and-economics analysis).

58.

RECONSTRUCTING AMERICAN LAW,

supra note 23, at 89-93.

59. Id. at 93.
60. It is clear that Ackerman is most influenced by the liberal theory of Rawls and the
law and economics of Coase and Calabresi. However, it is refreshing to see a scholar without pretension and hubris. Although he repeatedly emphasizes his fundamental disagreements with the radical left and right wings of legal theory, he thoughtfully adapts the positive contribution of Posnerian Chicago law and economics and the "Ungero-Marxist"
critique provided by CLS.
61. RECONSTRUCTING AMERICAN LAW, supra note 23, at 99.

554

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 33

liberal sense of optimism for the future-the answers lie at least a
generation away, and then only after meaningful constructivist dialogue. 62 Unfortunately, this is small comfort for the moment,
and no real response to the pure critics of liberalism.6 3 Many may
indeed be seduced by the "quick fix" of anti-liberals who promise
that the comprehensive legal solution has already arrived,
whether under the guise of critical legal studies or Chicago
economics.
To his credit, Ackerman is not in the business of offering placebos. His legal constructivism is a broad framework for continuing, future legal dialogue; it is anything but a definitive solution.
With liberal optimism, he welcomes the ensuing dialogue he has
hopefully engendered. He challenges the critics of present activist
liberalism who are virtually certain to reiterate their claim that
liberalism is incoherent. "The best way to motivate Constructive
legal work is to paint pictures of the brave new worlds that may
follow upon the failure of our present enterprise in liberal activism." 4 Ackerman certainly regards legal constructivism as the
most viable future for the activist liberal state concerned with social justice and personal liberty. However, he is the first to admit
that the success of constructivist dialogue is not guaranteed. Perhaps the legal profession will reject his invitation for constructivist
dialogue across the legal spectrum. Lawyers may indeed be seduced by critical-legal-studies nihilism or Chicago dogmatism.
More likely, "non-political" lawyers who eschew political discourse
will opt for the comfortable cocoon of fragmented Realism, and
quickly become numb and professionally inarticulate in a tomb of
their own making. This is a very real danger. The vast majority of
practicing lawyers do not have a developed sense of their political
responsibilities. They remain realist legal technicians, struggling
to win individual cases for individual clients on an ad hoc, daily
basis. This is how most practicing lawyers spend their careers: as
legal technicians. The Aristotelean artists of the legal profession
are the handful of academics concentrated at elite law schools. It
remains highly questionable whether they have a significant cumulative impact on the legal profession, let alone upon the lives and
62. Id. at 101.
63.
64.

Id. at 102-03.
Id. at 103.
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future of the American people. It is even more dubious whether
Ackerman and his relatively few fellow liberals will have sufficient
persuasive influence even among the law professoriat. Liberals are
sorely tested on all sides, and with the exception of the serious
work of Ackerman and a small cadre of liberal thinkers,6 5 the legal academic literature is largely dominated by radical leftist critical-legal-studies scholars and Chicago economists.
Professor Ackeiman has offered a provocative agenda for
professional dialogue. It deserves serious attention on its own substantial merits. Yet, ironically, if the profession as a whole is to
accept Ackerman's invitation, it may do so for ancillary, practical
reasons: if they master high technology, computers, and economics, it will be out of a desire to preserve professional stature and
influence in conventional adversarial fora. Lawyers will fight to
preserve their economic hegemony over the legal decisionmaking
process rather than yield to computer technocrats; they will
master the technology to preserve their professional economic
dominance rather than consciously to preserve their Tocquevillian
status as the de facto American political aristocracy. Ackerman is
fully aware of this. The law has always been perhaps the most resourceful of the professions. Lawyers will adapt to the complexities and rapidly changing circumstance of contemporary practice,
although probably more for ancillary pragmatic-economic rather
than activist-liberal reasons. Lawyers' selfish economics insures
that they will not willingly be reduced to the scribes of the technocrats. Preservation of economic self-interest alone virtually guarantees that lawyers will dominate, although probably no longer
monopolize, the most important legal and political decisionmaking
processes. Realist lawyers adapted to the New Deal. Despite its
fragmentation and obvious deficiencies, the realist tradition provided the legal and political glue to enable lawyers to function
professionally and to talk meaningfully through the half-century
evolution of the New Deal heritage. 66 While it will probably occur
in a far more simple and mundane fashion than the academics
would either endorse or understand, lawyers again will surely
move from the realist fragmentation into more fully integrated
65. For the work of fellow important contemporary liberals, John Rawls and Ronald
Dworkin, see supra note 21.
66. RECONSTRUaTING AMERICAN LAW, supra note 23, at 107.
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modes of thought and practice. Whether this will eventually be
tantamount to the legal constructivism of the activist liberal state
envisioned by Ackerman is all quite speculative.
Even the most crass legal technician is cognizant that the la*Vyer's money-making ability ultimately depends upon powers of
persuasion. This is an obviously crude and simplistic reduction of
the constructivist hope. However, whether in Plato's Academy,
the Roman Forum, or in the futuristic court of computer terminals and conference calls, one can rest assured that lawyers will, in
some fashion, remain true to the Socratic mandate: most lawyers
would rather die than quit talking. 67 Or, as Ackerman put it in a
more contemporary context, "[s]ince attorneys are essentially
hired talkers, they could hardly allow themselves-not to mention
others-[to] believe that they had been reduced to speechlessness.

..." Although it may well materialize in a fashion no one

yet fully envisions, lawyers will maintain their "professional commitment to public dialogue that must remain at the foundation of
the activist state if it is not one day to collapse upon us all in some
awful form of technocratic tyranny.

' 69

ReconstructingAmerican Law is an eloquent, conscientious statement by a premier liberal legal and political philosopher. Contemporary liberalism badly needed such a statement; it was in danger
of yielding the field to the radical left and right by its own relative
quiescence. The book's substantive merits are many. In an all-toorare example of academic openness and good grace, the often virulent critics of liberalism are invited into serious professional dialogue. The book is also an important and fitting complement to
Social Justice in the Liberal State. Perhaps most important, while
drawing on New Deal liberalism's classic strengths, Professor Ackerman has provided a remarkable open agenda, a challenging
starting point, for refined constructivistic discussion into the next
century. It is an optimistic invitation to talk, to engage in the very
essence of the lawyer's function. It is refreshingly free of the dogmatism and the nihilism that notoriously afflicts much of the legal
literature and perniciously chills professional discussion. And un67. Chafee, Book Review, 62 HARV. L. REv. 891, 900 (1949). "The individual interest
in freedom of speech, which Socrates voiced when he said that he would rather die than
stop talking, is too precious ...
." Id.
68. RECONSTRUCTING AMERICAN LAW, supra note 23, at 19.
69. Id. at l10.
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like much of the other academic literature devoted exclusively to
fellow academics, it is an invitation open to practicing attorneys as
well. It is comprehensible to the entire profession. While the book
is sure to have a very interested and critical academic audience, it
is more important that the book be read by the practitioners. ReconstructingAmerican Law contains messages and challenges vital to
all lawyers. Perhaps Ackerman's version of constructivism will be
eventually rejected, or, more likely, refined. However, especially if
the practicing lawyers accept the invitation for informed dialogue,
we will one day achieve social justice. The precise path that we
travel toward that state remains unclear, but the path will become
clear as the dialogue progresses. The absence of pristine absolute
answers from the outset should be not a cause of concern, but
rather a source of profound relief.
Professor Ackerman dedicated Reconstructing American Law to
the late Arthur Leff. Thus, it is fitting to remember that the exhilaration of law lies in the constantly evolving sense of its mystery, beauty, and complexity; Reconstructing American Law is faithful to the optimism of liberal progress, to the timeless wisdom that
"the path of the law leads not to the revelation of truth but to the
progressive discovery of infinite complexity. '70 Professor Ackerman hopes that the path may also lead to social justice in the liberal state-not as a final destination, but as a stage in a continual
evolution.
Reconstucting American Law is one of those rare books worth
taking to heart and translating into practice.

70.

Gilmore, For Arthur Leff, 91

YALE

L.J. 217, 218 (1981).
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